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Abstract. The axioms used to characterize the generalized Gini social evaluation
orderings for one-dimensional distributions are extended to the multidimensional
attributes case. A social evaluation ordering is shown to have a two-stage aggrega-
tion representation if these axioms and a separability assumption are satisﬁed. In
the ﬁrst stage, the distributions of each attribute are aggregated using generalized
Gini social evaluation functions. The functional form of the second-stage aggrega-
tor depends on the number of attributes and on which version of a comonotonic
additivity axiom is used. The implications of these results for the corresponding
multidimensional indices of relative and absolute inequality are also considered.
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An individual’s well-being depends on many factors, such as income, life expectancy,
and health status. Because of the multidimensional nature of well-being, univariate
indices of income inequality may give a misleading picture of the extent of inequality
within a given population or between diﬀerent groups of individuals. The formal
analysis of multidimensional inequality has its origins in a pioneering article by Kolm
(1977).1 In Kolm’s article and in the later work of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982),
the focus is on developing dominance criteria that can be used to determine when
one multidimensional distribution exhibits more inequality than another. Kolm
provided a number of multi-attribute generalizations of the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle, whereas Atkinson and Bourguignon proposed dominance principles that
take account of the correlation between the distributions of the diﬀerent components
of well-being.
The rankings generated by these dominance principles are incomplete. In many
circumstances, it is useful to have an index of inequality that can be used to compare
any pair of distributions. In the normative approach to inequality measurement, an
inequality index is constructed from a social evaluation ordering (or its represen-
tation, a social evaluation function) of the possible distributions.2 For univariate
distributions, the most commonly-used procedure for deriving a relative (i.e., scale
invariant) inequality index from a social evaluation ordering was independently pro-
posed by Atkinson (1970) and Kolm (1969) and popularized by Sen (1973). Kolm
(1969) also proposed a procedure for deriving an absolute (i.e., translation invariant)
inequality index from a social evaluation ordering. Multi-attribute generalizations
of the univariate Atkinson-Kolm-Sen and Kolm methodologies have been proposed
by Kolm (1977) and Tsui (1995), respectively.
This approach has been used by Tsui (1995) to develop new classes of multi-
attribute inequality indices. Tsui ﬁrst axiomatically characterized a class of social
evaluation functions that are multi-attribute generalizations of a class of social evalu-
ation functions for univariate distributions introduced by Blackorby, Donaldson, and
Auersperg (1981) and then he used the methodology described above to determine
the corresponding classes of relative and absolute inequality indices.3
The social evaluation functions identiﬁed by Tsui have the feature that they
can be constructed in two steps. A utility function is ﬁrst used to determine the
utility of each person’s allocation and then these utilities are aggregated (using
simple summation) to provide the overall evaluation. Maasoumi (1986) had earlier
suggested constructing a multi-attribute inequality index by ﬁrst using a utility
1For surveys of the literature on multidimensional inequality, see Maasoumi (1999) and Savaglio
(2002).
2A social evaluation ordering is sometimes called a social welfare ordering.
3Tsui (1999) has also axiomatized a class of multi-attribute generalized entropy relative inequal-
ity indices. However, these inequality indices are characterized directly, rather than indirectly using
social evaluation functions.
1function to generate a distribution of utilities and then applying a univariate index of
inequality to this distribution to obtain the multi-attribute index’s value. However,
unlike Tsui, the functional forms of the aggregator functions used at each stage are
simply assumed by Maasoumi, whereas Tsui derives them from his axioms. List
(1999) has proposed a hybrid approach. His procedure for constructing a multi-
atrribute inequality index is similar to that of Maasoumi, but the functional forms
of the aggregators at each stage are chosen in such a way that the resulting index is
necessarily consistent with a number of inequality dominance criteria.
In this article, we follow the general approach of Tsui (1995), but consider a dif-
ferent set of axioms. We extend the axioms used by Weymark (1981) to characterize
the generalized Gini social evaluation orderings for one-dimensional distributions to
the multi-attributes case. We show that a social evaluation ordering has a two-stage
aggregation representation if these axioms and a separability assumption are sat-
isﬁed. In the ﬁrst stage, the distributions of each attribute are aggregated using
univariate generalized Gini social evaluation functions. The functional form of the
second-stage aggregator depends on the number of attributes and on which version
of a comonotonic additivity axiom is used. Note that the order in which individ-
uals and attributes are aggregated is the reverse of the order used by Maasoumi
(1986), Tsui (1995), and List (1999). We also determine which of our orderings sat-
isfy the invariance assumptions needed to generate relative and absolute indices of
inequality. The implications of these results for the corresponding multidimensional
indices of relative and absolute inequality are also considered. Finally, we show that
our separability axioms are inconsistent with a correlation increasing majorization
axiom proposed by Tsui (1999) when individuals are treated symmetrically.
2. Preliminaries
The set of individuals is N = {1,...,n}, with n ≥ 2. There are q attributes of
well-being, with q ≥ 2. The set of attributes is Q = {1,...,q}. In addition to
income, examples of possible attributes are measures of educational attainment,
health status, and longevity. The q attributes could be incomes in diﬀerent states
of the world, in which case we are concerned with inequality under uncertainty,
as in Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997) and Gajdos and Maurin (2002).
Alternatively, the attributes could be incomes in diﬀerent time periods.
An allocation of attributes among the population is an n×q real-valued matrix. A
generic element of an allocation matrix X is xij, the quantity of attribute j allocated
to individual i. The ith row of a matrix X is denoted xi·, whereas its jth column is
denoted x·j. For all Q0 ⊆ Q for which Q0 6= ∅, let XQ0 be the sub-allocation matrix
of the attributes in Q0. For any j ∈ Q, if Q0 = {j}, we write x·j instead of X{j},
and if Q0 = {1,...,j − 1,j + 1,...,q}, we write X−j instead of XQ0. Let Q be the
set of bi-partitions of Q. Formally,
Q = {(Q1,Q2) ⊆ Q × Q|Q1 ∪ Q2 = Q, Q1 ∩ Q2 = ∅, Q1 6= ∅, Q2 6= ∅}.
2For all (Q1,Q2) ∈ Q, it is sometimes convenient to let (XQ1,XQ2) denote the matrix
X.
The set of all allocation matrices is M and the set of all allocation matrices whose
elements are nonnegative is M+. Let M∗
+ denote the set of allocation matrices in
M+ that have at least one positive element in each column. These three classes
of allocation matrices are the multidimensional analogues of the standard domains
used for univariate distributions of incomes. We also need to consider nonnegative
allocation matrices that only diﬀer from the null matrix in one column. Let M∗∗
+
denote this class of allocation matrices. The allocation matrix whose elements are
all equal to 0 (resp. 1) is 0 (resp. 1).
A social evaluation is a binary relation  on a set of allocation matrices D. The
relation  is interpreted as meaning “weakly socially preferred to”. The symmetric




. If not stated explicitly, D can be any one of these three sets. An
allocation matrix X is nonincreasing comonotonic if x1j ≥ x2j ≥ ··· ≥ xnj for all
j ∈ Q. Let DD denote the set of nonincreasing comonotonic matrices in D.
For any x ∈ Rn, ˜ x is the permutation of x for which ˜ x1 ≥ ˜ x2 ≥ ··· ≥ ˜ xn.4 Let
Rn∗
+ = Rn
+\{(0,...,0)}. For D ∈ {Rn,Rn
+,Rn∗
+ }, a generalized Gini social evaluation




ai˜ xi, ∀x ∈ D, (1)
where 0 < a1 ≤ a2 ≤ ··· ≤ an. The Gini social evaluation function is the special
case of (1) in which ai = (2i − 1)/n2 for all i ∈ N.
For any x ∈ Rn, µ(x) is the mean of x. For any X ∈ D, we let Xµ denote the
matrix for which every entry in the jth column is equal to µ(x·j).
3. Axioms
We now introduce our axioms. The ﬁrst axiom requires  to be a complete preorder.
Ordering (ORD). The binary relation  is reﬂexive, complete, and transitive on
D.
The next axiom says that a strict ranking of two allocation matrices X and Y
is invariant to small perturbations of these matrices.
Continuity (CONT). The sets {Y ∈ D|Y  X} and {Y ∈ D|X  Y } are open
for all X ∈ D.5
4R, R+, and R++ denote the set of real numbers, nonnegative real numbers, and positive real
numbers, respectively.
5A matrix in D can be thought of as a vector in Rnq. A subset of D is open if the corresponding
set of vectors is open in Rnq.
3The monotonicity axiom says that if X is obtained from Y by increasing at least
one person’s allocation of some attribute without decreasing anyone’s allocation of
any attribute, then X is strictly preferred to Y .
Monotonicity (MON). For all X,Y ∈ D,
[(xij ≥ yij, ∀(i,j) ∈ N × Q) & (X 6= Y )] ⇒ X  Y.
The anonymity axiom requires  to treat individuals symmetrically. It says that
it is a matter of social indiﬀerence if the individual allocations are permuted.
Anonymity (ANON). For all n × n permutation matrices Π and all X ∈ D,
X ∼ ΠX.
A number of diﬀerent partial orders have been suggested for formalizing the idea
that one allocation matrix exhibits less inequality than another when the mean value
for each attribute is the same in both matrices. See Marshall and Olkin (1979) and
Savaglio (2002). We consider three of these partial orders and, in each case, state
an axiom that requires  to regard one allocation matrix to be weakly preferred to
a second if the former exhibits less inequality according to this partial order than
the latter.
When there is only one attribute, say income, a Pigou-Dalton transfer is a trans-
fer of income from a richer to a poorer individual that diminishes the absolute value
of the diﬀerence between their incomes. After the transfer, the incomes of these two
individuals are convex combinations of their original incomes. In the multi-attribute
case, this kind of transfer can be applied to each attribute. When, for a given pair
of individuals, the same convex combinations are used for each attribute, we have a
uniform Pigou-Dalton transfer. The partial order of allocation matrices in this case
is deﬁned by considering ﬁnite sequences of such transfers.
Deﬁnition. For all X,Y ∈ D, X is obtained from Y by a uniform Pigou-Dalton
transfer if X 6= Y and there exist i1 and i2 in N and λ ∈ (0,1) such that (i)
xi1j = λyi1j + (1 − λ)yi2j for all j ∈ Q, (ii) xi2j = (1 − λ)yi1j + λyi2j for all j ∈ Q,
and (iii) xi· = yi· for all i / ∈ {i1,i2}.
Deﬁnition. For all X,Y ∈ D, X uniformly Pigou-Dalton majorizes Y , denoted
X U Y , whenever X can be obtained from Y by a ﬁnite sequence of uniform
Pigou-Dalton transfers.
Weak Uniform Pigou-Dalton Majorization (WUPM). For all X,Y ∈ D,
X U Y ⇒ X  Y.
In the one-dimensional case, one distribution can be obtained from a second by
a ﬁnite sequence of Pigou-Dalton transfers if and only if the former is obtained by
4multiplying the latter by a bistochastic matrix that is not a permutation matrix.6
Uniform majorization is the multi-attribute analogue of this construction.
Deﬁnition. For all X,Y ∈ D, X uniformly majorizes Y , denoted X B Y , if there
exists an n×n bistochastic matrix B such that X = BY and X is not a permutation
of the rows of Y .
Weak Uniform Majorization (WUM). For all X,Y ∈ D,
X B Y ⇒ X  Y.
If there are only two attributes, the partial orders U and B are equivalent. If
q > 2, X U Y implies X B Y , but the reverse implication need not hold. As a
consequence, Weak Uniform Majorization is a stronger condition than Weak Uniform
Pigou-Dalton Majorization. See Kolm (1977) and Marshall and Olkin (1979).
Another way in which an allocation matrix can be made more equal is to reduce
the correlation between its rows. One way to increase the correlation between the
rows of an allocation matrix is to rearrange two individuals’ allocations in such a
way that one of these individuals receives at least as much of every attribute as the
other. A sequence of this kind of correlation-increasing transfer increases inequality.
These ideas are made precise in the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition. For all X,Y ∈ D, Y is obtained from X by a correlation-increasing
transfer if X 6= Y and there exist i1,i2 ∈ N such that (i) yi1j = min{xi1j,xi2j} for
all j ∈ Q, (ii) yi2j = max{xi1j,xi2j} for all j ∈ Q, and (iii) yi· = xi· for all i / ∈ {i1,i2}.
Deﬁnition. For all X,Y ∈ D, Y is more correlated than X, denoted Y C X,
whenever Y can be obtained from X by a ﬁnite sequence of correlation-increasing
transfers.
Correlation Increasing Majorization (CIM). For all X,Y ∈ D,
Y C X ⇒ X  Y.
CIM was introduced into the inequality literature by Tsui (1999). It is based
on the concept of a multivariate arrangement increasing function due to Boland
and Proschan (1988). See Tsui (1999) for further discussion of this axiom and its
relationship to similar principles used in statistics and in the measurement of risk.
Note that CIM is stated in terms of the strict social evaluation relation ,
whereas WUPM and WUM use the weak relation . Strong versions of the latter
axioms can be obtained by replacing  with  in their deﬁnitions.
Weymark (1981) introduced a comonotonic additivity axiom for the ranking of
one-dimensional income distributions. It requires the ranking of two comonotonic
distributions to be invariant to the addition of a common distribution to both of
6A nonnegative square matrix is bistochastic if all of its row and column sums are equal to 1.
5these distributions provided that the third distribution is also comonotonic with
the original distributions. The rationale oﬀered for this axiom is that each person’s
income may come from a number of diﬀerent sources (wages, interest, etc.) and if
the incomes from all but once source of income are the same in two distributions
of total income, then the ranking of these distributions should only depend on the
distributions of income from the variable source.
We consider two multi-attribute extensions of this axiom. In both cases, we
require the ranking of two nonincreasing comonotonic allocation matrices X and Y
by  to be invariant to the common addition a third allocation matrix Z that is
nonincreasing comonotonic with respect to both X and Y . Our Weak Comonotonic
Additivity axiom applies if X and Y diﬀer in only one attribute and Z only has
non-zero values for this attribute. In our Strong Comonotonic Additivity axiom,
the distributions of any attribute in the three allocation matrices are permitted to
be diﬀerent from one another.
Weak Comonotonic Additivity (WCA). For all X,Y ∈ DD such that x·j = y·j
for all j 6= j0 and all Z ∈ DD ∪ M∗∗D
+ such that zij = 0 for all i ∈ N and all j 6= j0,
X  Y ⇔ X + Z  Y + Z.
Strong Comonotonic Additivity (SCA). For all X,Y ∈ DD and all Z ∈ DD ∪
M∗∗D
+ ,
X  Y ⇔ X + Z  Y + Z.
Note that if the domain is M∗
+, the allocation matrix Z that is added to both X
and Y is not in the domain if Z ∈ M∗∗D
+ . However, it is nevertheless the case that
X +Z and Y +Z are in the domain, which is all that is needed for our comonotonic
additivity principles to apply.
With the exception of CIM, all of the preceding axioms are multi-attribute ex-
tensions of axioms for one-dimensional distributions. Their one-dimensional coun-
terparts characterize the class of generalized Gini social evaluation functions with
positive weights. See Weymark (1981).7
If the conditional ordering of some subset of the variables obtained by ﬁxing the
values of the remaining variables is independent of the values of the conditioning
variables, then the ﬁrst set of variables is separable from the second. The next two
axioms are concerned with the separability of  across attributes. In the subse-
quent discussion, when we say that the set of attributes Q1 ⊆ Q is separable from
the complementary set of attributes, we mean that the set of all variables ij for
which i ∈ N and j ∈ Q1 is separable from the variables associated with the other
attributes. Weak Attribute Separability requires that there exist some attribute
7Weymark (1981) axiomatized the class of generalized Gini absolute inequality indices. It
is straightforward to modify his analysis in order to obtain an axiomatization of the class of
generalized Gini social evaluation functions. He did not employ a monotonicity assumption. As a
consequence, the weights in his representation theorem need not be positive.
6that is separable from the other attributes. Strong Attribute Separability strength-
ens this condition by requiring any subset of the attributes to be separable from the
other attributes.8
Weak Attribute Separability (WSEP). There exists j0 ∈ Q such that for all

















Strong Attribute Separability (SSEP). For all (Q1,Q2) ∈ Q and all XQ1, YQ1,

















In the normative approach to inequality measurement for one-dimensional dis-
tributions (see Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1969), and Sen (1973)), an inequality index
is derived from a social evaluation function. A relative inequality index is invariant
to a proportional change in all incomes, whereas an absolute inequality index is
invariant if a common amount is added to or subtracted from all incomes. In order
for an inequality index to be a relative (resp. absolute) index, the underlying social
evaluation ordering must be homothetic (resp. translatable). Our ﬁnal axioms are
concerned with multi-attribute generalizations of these invariance properties for the
social evaluation ordering .
Weak Homotheticity simply extends the requirement that the social evaluation
ordering be homothetic to the multi-attribute case.
Weak Homotheticity (WHOM). For all X,Y ∈ D and all λ > 0,
X  Y ⇔ λX  λY.
If there is only one attribute, homotheticity of the social evaluation ordering is
equivalent to requiring that the ordering be invariant to any change in the units in
which the attribute is measured. Tsui (1995) has suggested that the same invari-
ance property should hold in the multi-attribute case. In other words, independent
changes in the units in which diﬀerent attributes are measured should not aﬀect the
social evaluation ordering, a property we call Strong Homotheticity.
Strong Homotheticity (SHOM). For all X,Y ∈ D and all q×q diagonal matrices
Λ for which λjj > 0 for all j ∈ Q,
X  Y ⇔ XΛ  Y Λ.
8In order to avoid introducing even more notation, we do not explicitly state the domains for
the various variables that appear in the statement of the two separability axioms. Each of the
allocation matrices considered in these axioms must be in D. See Blackorby, Primont, and Russell
(1978) for further discussion of these separability axioms.
7SHOM is a natural assumption if the attributes are diﬀerent kinds of goods,
such as income and life expectancy. However, if diﬀerent attributes are incomes in
diﬀerent states or time periods, then the attributes should be measured in the same
units, in which case SHOM is inappropriate.
The multi-attribute analogue of the requirement that the social evaluation or-
dering be translatable is Weak Translatability.
Weak Translatability (WTRA). For all X,Y ∈ D and all λ ∈ R for which
X + λ1 ∈ D and Y + λ1 ∈ D,
X  Y ⇔ X + λ1  Y + λ1.
In the one-attribute case, translatability of the social evaluation ordering is equiv-
alent to requiring the ordering to be invariant to any change in the origin from which
the quantity of the attribute is measured. Strong Translatability, an axiom proposed
by Tsui (1995), extends this condition by requiring that the social evaluation order-
ing be invariant to independent changes in the origins from which the quantities of
the various attributes are measured. As with SHOM, this condition is inappropriate
if there are attributes that should be measured using the same scale.
Strong Translatability (STRA). For all X,Y ∈ D and all q×q diagonal matrices
Λ for which X + 1Λ ∈ D and Y + 1Λ ∈ D,
X  Y ⇔ X + 1Λ  Y + 1Λ.
These four invariance axioms are closely related to axioms used in the literature
on social choice with interpersonal comparisons of utility.9 In this literature, a social
welfare ordering is deﬁned on distributions of utilities, one for each person. A social
welfare ordering is ratio-scale measurable and fully comparable if the ranking of any
two utility vectors is invariant to a proportional scaling of all utilities and it is ratio-
scale measurable if the factor of proportionality can be person-speciﬁc. Similarly,
a social welfare ordering is translation-scale measurable and fully comparable if the
ranking of any two utility vectors is invariant when a common amount is added to or
subtracted from all utilities and it is translation-scale measurable when the amounts
added or subtracted can be person-speciﬁc. Although social welfare orderings are
deﬁned on vectors of utilities and the social evaluation orderings considered here are
deﬁned on allocation matrices, we are nevertheless able to exploit social choice the-
orems that use these ratio-scale and translation-scale axioms in Sections 5 and 6 to
help characterize classes of multidimensional generalised Gini relative and absolute
inequality indices.
9For an introduction to this literature, see Bossert and Weymark (1996).
84. Multidimensional Generalized Gini Social Evaluation Or-
derings
In this section, we show that if multi-attribute versions of the axioms that character-
ize the class of generalized Gini social evaluation orderings for univarate distributions
are combined with SSEP, then the social evaluation ordering can be represented by a
two-stage aggregator function. In the ﬁrst stage, the distributions of each attribute
are aggregated using a univariate generalized Gini social evaluation function. The
weights in these functions can be attribute speciﬁc. In the second stage, the values
of these generalized Ginis are aggregated. The functional form of the second-stage
aggregator depends on which version of our comonotonic additivity axiom is used
and on the number of attributes.
Our characterization theorems do not depend on whether our multi-attribute
generalization of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is WUPM or WUM. The dif-
ferences between these axioms are only manifested if q > 2. However, in the presence
of ANON and SSEP, the implications of WUPM and WUM can be determined one
attribute at a time. Consequently, as we show in Theorem 1, WUPM and WUM
place equivalent restrictions on a social evaluation ordering if it satisﬁes ANON and
SSEP.





. If the binary relation  on D
satisﬁes SSEP and ANON, then  satisﬁes WUM if and only if it satisﬁes WUPM.
Proof. Because X U Y implies X B Y for all X,Y ∈ D, if  satisﬁes WUM, it
also satisﬁes WUPM. Hence, we only need to show that the converse implication
holds.
Suppose that  satisﬁes SSEP, ANON, and WUPM. Let X,Y ∈ D be such that
X B Y .
Let ˆ X1 = (x·1,1−1) and ˆ Y 1 = (y·1,1−1). Two cases may arise. In the ﬁrst case,
x·1 is a permutation of y·1.10 By ANON, it then follows that ˆ X1 ∼ ˆ Y 1. In the
second case, x·1 is not a permutation of y·1. Then, ˆ X1 is obtained from ˆ Y 1 by a
ﬁnite sequence of uniform Pigou-Dalton transfers. Therefore, because  satisﬁes
WUPM, we have ˆ X1  ˆ Y 1. Hence, in both cases, ˆ X1  ˆ Y 1. But this implies, by
SSEP, that X1  Y , where X1 = (x·1,Y−1).
By the same reasoning as above, we have (x·2,1−2)  (y·2,1−2), and therefore,
by SSEP, that X2  X1, where X2 = (x·2,X1
−2). Because X1  Y , transitivity of
 then implies that X2  Y . Note that X2 = (X{1,2},YQ\{1,2}).
By iterating this process on Q, we conclude that X  Y .
In view of Theorem 1, it doesn’t matter which of WUPM and WUM we include
in our set of axioms. For concreteness, we use WUPM. In all of the characterization
theorems in this section, we suppose that the social evaluation ordering  satisﬁes
ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, and SSEP.
10Note that this case applies if x·1 = y·1.
9As is well-known, the functional structure implications of separability axioms
that operate on all bi-partitions of a set of variables depend on whether the number
of variables being partitioned is two or whether it is three or more. See, for example,
Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978). With SSEP, the variables being partitioned
are the attributes. We ﬁrst consider the case in which there are three or more at-
tributes. When this is the case, Theorem 2 shows that  can be represented by a
two-stage aggregator function, as described above, where the second-stage aggrega-
tor is a continuous, increasing additive function of the generalized Gini aggregators
used in the ﬁrst stage if WCA is added to the six axioms listed in the preceding
paragraph.
Theorem 2. Suppose that D = M (resp. D = M+, resp. D = M∗
+). If q > 2, then
the binary relation  on D satisﬁes ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP,
and WCA if and only if there exists an n×q matrix A of positive coeﬃcients with a·j
nondecreasing and
Pn
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q and there exist q continuous increasing
functions vj: R → R (resp. vj: R+ → R, resp. vj: R++ → R) such that
















, ∀X,Y ∈ D. (2)
Furthermore, the functions vj are unique up to a common increasing aﬃne trans-
formation and the matrix of coeﬃcients A is unique.
Proof. The necessity part of the theorem is straightforward to verify. We therefore
only prove suﬃciency. We establish the theorem for the domain D = M.11
By Theorem I in Debreu (1954), we know that if  satisﬁes ORD, CONT, and
MON, then there exists a continuous, increasing function f : D → R that represents
. Furthermore, for all j ∈ Q, SSEP implies that the jth attribute is separable
from the the complementary set of attributes. Note that MON implies that every
attribute is essential.12 Because q > 2, Theorem 3 in Debreu (1960) applies. Hence,
there exist q continuous and increasing functions Uj: Rn → R such that






Uj(y·j), ∀X,Y ∈ D. (3)
Furthermore, the functions Uj are unique up to a common increasing aﬃne trans-
formation.
Consider any X ∈ D. For all j ∈ Q, we deﬁne the binary relation j on Rn by
setting
y·j j z·j ⇔ (y·j,X−j)  (z·j,X−j), ∀y·j,z·j ∈ R
n. (4)
11For the domain M+ (resp. M∗
+), Rn must be changed to Rn
+ (resp. Rn
++) throughout the
proof, but otherwise the argument is identical.
12The jth attribute is essential if there exist values for the allocations of the other attributes
such that the conditional ordering of the allocations of the jth attribute is not the trivial one in
which all allocations are indiﬀerent to each other.
10Because of SSEP, j does not depend on the choice of the matrix X. For all j ∈ Q,
(3) implies that j can be represented by Uj.
Consider any j ∈ Q. Because  satisﬁes CONT and ANON, j is a continuous,
symmetric ordering of Rn. Now, consider any y·j,z·j,t·j ∈ Rn and any X ∈ DD.
By (4), ˜ y·j j ˜ t·j implies (X−j, ˜ y·j)  (X−j, ˜ z·j). Note that (X−j, ˜ y·j) and (X−j, ˜ z·j)
both belong to DD. Applying WCA, we obtain
(X−j, ˜ y·j)  (X−j, ˜ z·j) ⇔ (X−j, ˜ y·j) + (0−j,˜ t·j)  (X−j, ˜ z·j) + (0−j,˜ t·j).
Equivalently,
(X−j, ˜ y·j)  (X−j, ˜ z·j) ⇔ (X−j, ˜ y·j + ˜ t·j)  (X−j, ˜ z·j + ˜ t·j).
We have thus shown that
˜ y·j j ˜ z·j ⇔ ˜ y·j + ˜ t·j j ˜ z·j + ˜ t·j, ∀y·j,z·j,t·j ∈ R
n.
Therefore, j satisﬁes Axiom 4 in Weymark (1981). It then follows from MON and
Theorem 3 in Weymark (1981) that there exist aij > 0, i ∈ N, such that






aij˜ yij, ∀x·j,y·j ∈ R
n.13 (5)
We adopt the normalization
P
i aij = 1, which implies that the sequence of weights
(aij)i is unique. WUPM implies that j satisﬁes the weak form of the unidimensional
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, which in turn implies that a1j ≤ a2j ≤ ··· ≤ anj.14




aij˜ xij, ∀x·j ∈ R
n. (6)
Because j is symmetric, (5) implies that Gj is a continuous representation of j.
Because Uj is also a continuous representation of j, there exists a continuous,
increasing function vj: R → R such that Uj = vj ◦ Gj.
The preceding argument holds for all j ∈ Q. It then follows that (3) can be
rewritten as (2). Because the functions Uj are unique up to a common increasing
aﬃne transformation, so are the functions vj.
SSEP and ORD imply that the conditional ordering of the distributions of any
attribute are independent of the values of the other variables. The proof of Theorem
2 shows that the properties of these orderings that are inherited from the axioms of
13Weymark’s theorem is for vectors in Rn
+, but, as he notes, it also holds for vectors in Rn.
14The weak form of the unidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is simply the one attribute
analogue of WUPM. See, for example, Hardy, Littlewood, and P´ olya (1934) or Marshall and Olkin
(1979).
11the theorem are exactly those properties that are used to characterize the univari-
ate generalized Ginis. This accounts for the functional structure of the ﬁrst-stage
aggregators. The additive structure of the second-stage aggregator follows from a
standard separability theorem for three or more variables.
In Theorem 3, we consider the same set of axioms as in Theorem 2, but now
suppose that there are only two attributes. Reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 2,
the ﬁrst-stage aggregators are generalized Ginis. However, because the separability
axiom only operates on bi-partitions of two attributes, we can no longer conclude
that the second-stage aggregator is additive.
Theorem 3. Suppose that D = M (resp. D = M+, resp. D = M∗
+). If q = 2, then
the binary relation  on D satisﬁes ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP,
and WCA if and only if there exists an n × 2 matrix A of positive coeﬃcients with
a·j nondecreasing and
Pn
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ {1,2} and there exists a continuous
increasing function V : R2 → R (resp. V : R2
+ → R, resp V : R2
++ → R) such that
X  Y ⇔ V
















∀X,Y ∈ D. (7)
Furthermore, the function V is unique up to an increasing transformation and the
matrix of coeﬃcients A is unique.
Proof. The necessity part of the theorem is straightforward to verify. We therefore
only prove suﬃciency. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we only consider the domain
M as it is trivial to modify the proof so that it applies to the other two domains.
We know from the proof of Theorem 2 that ORD, CONT, MON, and SSEP
imply that  can be represented by a continuous, increasing function f : D → R.
Furthermore, for all j ∈ Q, the jth attribute is essential and separable from the the
complementary set of attributes. Hence, by Lemma 1 in Gorman (1968), there exist
three continuous increasing functions U0: U1(R2) × U2(R2) → R, U1: R2 → R, and
U2: R2 → R such that
X  Y ⇔ U0(U1(x·1),U2(x·2)) ≥ U0(U1(y·1),U2(y·2)), ∀X,Y ∈ D. (8)
For j = 1,2, deﬁning j as in (3), the same argument as the one used in the proof
of Theorem 2 implies that j can be represented by Uj and that there exist two
nondecreasing series of positive weights (aij)i for which
Pn
i=1 aij = 1 such that
x·j j y·j ⇔ Gj(x·j) ≥ Gj(y·j), ∀x·j,y·j ∈ R
n,
where Gj is deﬁned in (6). Furthermore, each of these series of weights is unique.
Therefore, for j = 1,2, there exists a nondecreasing continuous function vj: R → R
such that Uj = vj ◦ Gj. Substituting in (6), we obtain
X  Y ⇔ U0(v1(Gj(x·1)),v2(Gj(x·2)) ≥ U0(v1(Gj(y·1)),v2(Gj(y·2))),
∀X,Y ∈ D. (9)
12Deﬁning the function V : R2 → R by setting V (α,β) = U0(v1(α),v2(β)) for all
(α,β) ∈ R2 and substituting V into (9), we obtain (7). Clearly, (7) is also satisﬁed
if V is subjected to an increasing transformation.
The ﬁnal characterization theorem in this section strengthens WCA to SCA.
Theorem 4 shows that the second-stage aggregator in this case must be linear, and
this is true for any number of attributes (greater than or equal to 2). As in Theorems
2 and 3, the ﬁrst-stage aggregators are generalized Ginis.





. The binary relation  on D
satisﬁes ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, and SCA if and only if there
exists an n×q matrix A of positive coeﬃcients with a·j nondecreasing and
Pn
i=1 aij =




i=1 γj = 1 such that


















, ∀X,Y ∈ D. (10)
Furthermore, the matrix of coeﬃcients A and the vector γ are unique.
Proof. It is straightforward to show necessity, so we only establish the suﬃciency
part of the theorem.
We ﬁrst show that ORD, CONT, and SCA imply that  can be represented by
a linear functional on DD, the set of nonincreasing comonotonic matrices in D. For
X ∈ DD, let E(X) = {Y ∈ D|Y ∼ X} and B(X) = {Y ∈ D|Y  X}. By applying
the argument used by Weymark (1981) in the proof of his Theorem 3, it follows that
E(X) is a convex set.15 By interpreting elements of DD as vectors in Rnq, MON then
implies that E(X) is the restriction of an (nq−1)−dimensional hyperplane in Rnq to
DD. Hence, the indiﬀerence contours of  in DD are parallel (qn − 1)−dimensional
hyperplanes. For an arbitrary Z ∈ B(X), we choose a matrix B ∈ M in the



















bijyij, ∀X,Y ∈ D
D.
Because SCA implies WCA, Theorem 2 applies if q > 2 and Theorem 3 applies
if q = 2. Consider any X,X0 ∈ D for which each column of X0 can be obtained by
a permutation of the corresponding column of X. It then follows from either (2) or
(7) that X ∼ X0. Hence,










bij˜ yij, ∀X,Y ∈ D. (11)
In order for (11) to be consistent with (2) and (7), the functions vj, j ∈ N, in (2)
and the function V in (7) must be linear. Thus, (10) holds. The uniqueness of A and
γ then follow from the corresponding uniqueness results in Theorems 2 and 3.
15Weymark’s argument is for the set of nonincreasing vectors in Rn
+, but his argument applies
equally well to the domain DD.
13The key insight underlying the proof of Theorem 4 is that ORD, CONT, and SCA
imply that  can be represented by a linear functional on the set of nonincreasing
comonotonic matrices in D. This is only consistent with what has been established
in Theorems 2 and 3 if the second-stage aggregator function is linear.
5. Homothetic Social Evaluation Orderings
Normative indices of relative inequality are constructed using homothetic social eval-
uation orderings. In this section, for each of the theorems in the preceding section,
we consider the implications of also requiring the social evaluation function to sat-
isfy one of our homotheticity axioms. When deﬁning relative inequality indices, it is
customary to assume that there is a positive amount of each attribute. Accordingly,
in this section, we suppose that the domain of the social evaluation ordering is M∗
+.
We begin by assuming that there are at least three attributes and supplement
the axioms in Theorem 2 with WHOM. In this case, WHOM places strong restric-
tions on the functional form of the second-stage aggregator—it must be a mean of
order r function. In other words, the function that aggregates the values of the
generalized Ginis for the q attributes must be a constant-elasticity-of-substitution
function. When r = 0, this aggregator is a Cobb-Douglas function.
Theorem 5. If q > 2, then the binary relation  on M∗
+ satisﬁes ORD, CONT,
MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, WCA, and WHOM if and only if there exists an
n × q matrix A of positive coeﬃcients with a·j nondecreasing and
Pn
i=1 aij = 1 for




j=1 γj = 1, and a scalar r such that


























, ∀X,Y ∈ M
∗
+, (12)
if r 6= 0 and
X  Y ⇔
q Y
j=1











, ∀X,Y ∈ M
∗
+, (13)
if r = 0. Furthermore, the matrix of coeﬃcients A, the vector γ, and the scalar r
are unique.
Proof. The necessity of the axioms is easy to check, so we only establish the suﬃ-
ciency part of the theorem.
By Theorem 2, (2) must be satisﬁed. Let W : R
q




vj(gj), ∀g ∈ R
q
++, (14)
where the functions vj are the functions that appear in (2). Because these functions
are continuous and increasing, so is W. Because  satisﬁes WHOM, (2) implies
14that W is ratio-scale measurable and fully comparable. Hence, by Theorem 2 in
Blackorby and Donaldson (1982), W must be a mean of order r function. That is,
















, ∀g ∈ R
q
++, (15)





γj, ∀g ∈ R
q
++, (16)
if r = 0. It then follows from (2), (14), (15), and (16) that (12) and (13) hold. In
view of the normalization adopted for γ, the parameters A, γ, and r are unique.
The suﬃciency part of the proof of Theorem 5 exploits the fact that we know
from Theorem 2 that the social evaluation ordering can be represented by a two-
stage aggregator function and that the ﬁrst-stage aggregators are generalized Ginis.
WHOM implies that the second-stage aggregator function is ratio-scale measurable
and fully comparable and this permits us to use a result from the social choice liter-
ature due to Blackorby and Donaldson (1982) to characterize the set of admissible
second-stage aggregators.
The characterization in Theorem 5 makes essential use of our earlier result that
the second-stage aggregator is additively separable. If there are only two attributes,
the second-stage aggregator need not be separable. As a consequence, when the
axioms in Theorem 3 are supplemented with WHOM, the only additional structure
placed on the function V in (7) is that it is homothetic.16
Our next theorem demonstrates that the second-stage aggregator in Theorem
5 must be a Cobb-Douglas function if WHOM is strengthened to SHOM. Further,
this conclusion holds if there are two or more attributes, not just if there are at least
three.
Theorem 6. If q ≥ 2, then the binary relation  on M∗
+ satisﬁes ORD, CONT,
MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, WCA, and SHOM if and only if there exists an n×q
matrix A of positive coeﬃcients with a·j nondecreasing and
Pn
i=1 aij = 1 for all




j=1 γj = 1 such that (13) holds. Furthermore,
the matrix of coeﬃcients A and the vector γ are unique.
Proof. We only establish the suﬃciency part of the theorem as necessity is straight-
forward to verify.
It follows from Theorems 2 and 3 that there exists an n×q matrix A of positive
coeﬃcients with a·j nondecreasing and
Pn
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q and there exists a
16To economize on space, we do not state this result formally.
15continuous increasing function V : R
q
++ → R such that
X  Y ⇔ V



















By SHOM, V is ratio-scale measurable. Hence, by Theorem 4 in Tsui and Weymark
(1997), V must be a continuous increasing transform of a Cobb-Douglas function
with positive coeﬃcients. That is, V must be a continuous increasing transform
of a function of the form given in (16). The uniqueness of A and γ (given the
normalization rule for γ) follows from Theorems 2 and 3.
When there are at least three attributes, Theorem 6 is a corollary to Theorem
5. SHOM implies that the second-stage aggregator function is separable, and this is
enough separability for the q > 2 characterization to also hold when there are only
two attributes.
The second-stage aggregator function in (10) is linear. Consequently, the social
evaluation orderings identiﬁed in Theorem 4 also satisfy WHOM. Note that, when
q > 2, this linear aggregator is obtained by setting r = 1 in Theorem 5. However, if
SHOM is added to the axioms in Theorem 4, an impossibility theorem is obtained
because having a linear second-stage aggregator is inconsistent with Theorem 6.
Theorem 7. If q ≥ 2, there is no binary relation  on M∗
+ that satisﬁes ORD,
CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, SCA, and SHOM.
Proof. On the contrary, suppose that there exists a  that satisﬁes these eight
axioms. Then, by Theorem 4, (10) must hold and by Theorem 6, (13) must hold.
However, (10) and (13) are inconsistent.
6. Translatable Social Evaluation Orderings
Normative indices of absolute inequality are constructed from translatable social
evaluation orderings. In this section, we provide the corresponding results for trans-
latable social evaluation orderings to those established in the preceding section for
homothetic social evaluation orderings. For simplicity, we now suppose that the
domain of the social evaluation ordering is M.
If WTRA is used instead of WHOM in Theorem 5 and the domain is changed
from M∗
+ to M, then the second-stage aggregator must be a Kolm-Pollak function.
Of particular note is that linear aggregation functions are members of this class.
Theorem 8. If q > 2, then the binary relation  on M satisﬁes ORD, CONT,
MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, WCA, and WTRA if and only if there exists an
17When q > 2, we also know from Theorem 2 that V is additive.
16n × q matrix A of positive coeﬃcients with a·j nondecreasing and
Pn
i=1 aij = 1 for
all j ∈ Q, a vector γ ∈ R
q
++, and a scalar r such that































∀X,Y ∈ M, (18)
if r 6= 0 and
















, ∀X,Y ∈ M, (19)
if r = 0. Furthermore, the matrix of coeﬃcients A, the vector γ, and the scalar r
are unique.
Proof. With the following modiﬁcations, the proof of this theorem is the same as the
proof ofTheorem 5. Because  satisﬁes WTRA instead of WHOM, the function W
(now deﬁned on Rq) is translation-scale measurable and fully comparable. Hence, by
Theorem 3 in Blackorby and Donaldson (1982), W must be a Kolm-Pollak function.















, ∀g ∈ R
q, (20)




γjgj, ∀g ∈ R
q, (21)
if r = 0.
If q = 2, the axioms in Theorem 8 characterize the subset of the social evaluation
orderings characterized in Theorem 3 for which the function V in (7) is translatable.
Theorem 9 shows that if STRA is substituted for SHOM in Theorem 6 and the
domain is changed from M∗
+ to M, then the second-stage aggregator must be linear.
Theorem 9. If q ≥ 2, then the binary relation  on M satisﬁes ORD, CONT,
MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, WCA, and STRA if and only if there exists an n×q
matrix A of positive coeﬃcients with a·j nondecreasing and
Pn
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q
and a vector γ ∈ R
q
++ such that (19) holds. Furthermore, the matrix of coeﬃcients
A and the vector γ are unique.
Proof. With the following modiﬁcations, the proof of this theorem is the same as
the proof of Theorem 6. Because  satisﬁes STRA instead of SHOM, the function
V (now deﬁned on Rq) is translation-scale measurable. Hence, by Theorem 8.1 in
Bossert and Weymark (1996), V must be a continuous increasing transform of a
function of the form given in (21).
17In Theorems 5 and 6, the second-stage aggregation function represents a bi-
nary relation R on R
q
++. We can deﬁne an ordering R∗ on R by setting uR∗v ⇔
(exp(u1),...,exp(uq))R(exp(v1),...,exp(vq)) for all u,v ∈ Rq. The ordering R is
continuous, increasing, and ratio-scale measurable and fully comparable (resp. ratio-
scale measurable) if and only if R∗ is continuous, increasing, and translation-scale
measurable and fully comparable (resp. translation-scale measurable). This obser-
vation accounts for why the functional forms of the second-stage aggregators in
Theorems 8 and 9 can be obtained from those in Theorems 5 and 6 by a simple
exponential change of variables.
Note that the social evaluation orderings identiﬁed in Theorem 4 also satisfy
STRA (and, hence, WTRA). Thus, Theorem 9 also characterizes all of the social
evaluation orderings on M that satisfy ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP,
SCA, and WTRA (resp. STRA). Because the second-stage aggregator is linear, the
conﬂict we found in Theorem 7 with SHOM does not arise if STRA is used instead.
7. Multidimensional Inequality Indices
The Atkinson-Kolm-Sen (see Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1969), and Sen (1973)) and
Kolm (1969) procedures for constructing univariate indices of relative and abso-
lute inequality, respectively, both employ a particular representation of the so-
cial evaluation function known as the equally-distributed-equivalent income func-
tion. The equally-distributed-equivalent income associated with a given univariate
income distribution is the per capita income which, if distributed equally, is indif-
ferent to the actual income distribution according to the social evaluation ordering.
The equally-distributed-equivalent income function is the mapping that assigns the
equally-distributed-equivalent income to each income distribution in the domain.
The Atkinson-Kolm-Sen inequality index measures inequality by computing the ra-
tio of the equally-distributed-equivalent income to the mean income and subtracting
this value from 1. This index is a relative index if the underlying social evaluation
function is homothetic. The Kolm inequality index measures inequality by the diﬀer-
ence between the mean income and the equally-distributed-equivalent income. This
index is an absolute index if the underlying social evaluation function is translatable.
In this section, we describe how the multi-attribute generalizations of the Atkinson-
Kolm-Sen and Kolm inequality indices due to Kolm (1977) and Tsui (1995), respec-
tively, are constructed. We also derive the functional forms of these indices for some
of the social evaluation orderings characterized in the preceding sections. For further
discussion of this approach to the measurement of multidimensional inequality, see
Tsui (1995) and Weymark (1999).
As a domain, we use M∗
+ when we consider relative inequality indices and we
use M when we consider absolute inequality indices. Throughout this section, we
suppose that the social evaluation function  satisﬁes the following basic properties:
ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, and WUPM.
We begin by considering relative indices of inequality. In the univariate case,
18the value of the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen inequality index for a given distribution has
a natural interpetation. It is the fraction of the aggregate income that could be
destroyed if incomes are equalized and the resulting distribution is socially indiﬀer-
ent to the original distribution. The Kolm (1977) multi-attribute generalization of
this index measures the inequality of an allocation by the fraction of the aggregate
amount of each attribute that could be destroyed if every attribute is equalized and
the resulting allocation is indiﬀerent to the original allocation according to .
Formally, we ﬁrst deﬁne the function ∆R: M∗
+ → R by setting, for each X ∈
M∗
+, ∆R(X) equal to the scalar that solves
∆R(X)Xµ ∼ X.18 (22)
Our assumptions on  ensure that ∆R is well-deﬁned. The multi-attribute Kolm
inequality index associated with  is the function IR: M∗
+ → R deﬁned by setting
IR(X) = 1 − ∆R(X), ∀X ∈ M
∗
+. (23)
If  satisﬁes WHOM, then IR is a relative index.
It is easy to determine the functional form of the multi-attribute Kolm inequality
index that corresponds to each of the social evaluation orderings identiﬁed in Section
























































, ∀X ∈ M
∗
+, (24)
is the multi-attribute Kolm inequality index corresponding to (12).
This index has a particularly simple form if r = 1, γj = 1/q for all j ∈ Q (so
each attribute receives the same weight), and the Gini social evaluation function is






, ∀X ∈ M
∗
+, (25)
18Recall that Xµ is the allocation matrix for which every entry in the jth column is equal to
µ(x·j).
19where IRG(x·j) is the relative Gini inequality index evaluated at the distribution x·j.
This index diﬀers from the arithmetic mean of the relative Gini inequality indices
for the individual attributes, which Koshevoy and Mosler (1997, p. 275) describe as
being a “popular approach” to measuring multidimensional inequality, because the
weights in (25) depend on the relative quantities of the attributes.
Similar calculations show that the multi-attribute Kolm inequality index corre-
sponding to (13) is







j=1 µ(x·j)γj , ∀X ∈ M
∗
+. (26)
If γj = 1/q for all j ∈ Q and the Gini social evaluation function is used as the
ﬁrst-stage aggregator for each attribute, then (26) simpliﬁes to





q, ∀X ∈ M
∗
+, (27)
where ERG(x·j) = 1 − IRG(x·j) is the relative Gini equality index evaluated at the
distribution x·j.
We now consider absolute indices of inequality. The univariate Kolm inequality
index is equal to the amount of income that could be taken away from every in-
dividual in order to obtain a distribution that is socially indiﬀerent to the original
distribution if incomes are equalized. The generalization of this index proposed by
Tsui (1995) measures inequality by the amount of each attribute that could be taken
away from every individual in order to obtain an allocation that is indiﬀerent to the
original allocation according to  if the distribution of each attribute is equalized.
To deﬁne Tsui’s index formally, we ﬁrst deﬁne the function ∆A: M → R by
setting, for each X ∈ M, ∆A(X) equal to the scalar that solves
Xµ − ∆A(X)1 ∼ X. (28)
Our assumptions on  ensure that ∆A is well-deﬁned. The multi-attribute Tsui
inequality index associated with  is the function IA: M → R deﬁned by setting
IA(X) = ∆A(X), ∀X ∈ M. (29)
If  satisﬁes WTRA, then IA is an absolute index.
We illustrate the construction of IA using the social evaluation orderings in (18)































20Hence, by (29), the multi-attribute Tsui inequality index corresponding to (18) is
given by











, ∀X ∈ M. (30)
Similarly, the multi-attribute Tsui inequality index corresponding to (19) is










, ∀X ∈ M. (31)
If γj = 1/q for all j ∈ Q and the Gini social evaluation function is used as the








, ∀X ∈ M, (32)
where IAG(x·j) is the absolute Gini inequality index evaluated at the distribution x·j.
Thus, in contrast to the relative case, taking the arithmetic average of the absolute
Gini inequality indices for the individual attributes yields a multi-attribute index of
absolute inequality that is consistent with our approach.
8. Correlation Increasing Majorization
WUPM and WUM are multi-attribute generalizations of the Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle. In contrast, CIM is a majorization axiom that has no univariate coun-
terpart. CIM regards a correlation-increasing transfer as being socially undesirable.
By its very deﬁnition, CIM takes account of the dependencies that exist between
the distributions of diﬀerent attributes. The theorems in the preceding sections all
employ SSEP as one of their axioms. SSEP requires the conditional distribution of
any attribute to be independent of the distributions of the other attributes. This
separability of the social evaluation ordering  across attributes creates a tension
between CIM and SSEP. This tension is also present if SSEP is weakened to WSEP;
i.e., if only one attribute is required to be separable from the other attributes. The-
orem 10 shows that this conﬂict is fundamental: If  satisﬁes ANON, it is not
possible to satisfy both CIM and WSEP.





. Then, there does not exist a
binary relation  on D that satisﬁes ANON, WSEP, and CIM.
Proof. Let  be a binary relation on D satisfying WSEP and ANON. By WSEP,
there exists an attribute j0 such that j0 is separable from the attributes in Q\{j0}.
Let X ∈ D be deﬁned by setting (i) xij = 1 for all j 6= j0 and all i ∈ N and (ii)
xij0 = i for all i. Deﬁne Y ∈ D by setting (i) yij = xij for all j 6= j0 and all i ∈ N and
21(ii) yij0 = n−i+1 for all i ∈ N. Note that Y is obtained from X by a permutation
of the rows of X. Hence, by ANON, X ∼ Y . Now, consider the matrices X0 and Y 0
obtained from X and Y , respectively, by replacing, for all j 6= j0 and all i ∈ N, xij
and yij0 with i. Because j0 is separable from Q\{j0}, X ∼ Y implies that X0 ∼ Y 0.
The columns of X0 are all identical, whereas those of Y 0 are not. Consequently,
X0 C Y 0, which violates CIM.
The argument used in the proof of Theorem 10 can be illustrated quite simply
when n = q = 3. For concreteness, suppose that attribute 3 is separable from




















By WSEP, indiﬀerence is preserved if the ﬁrst two columns of X and Y are replaced
by any other entries, provided that the replacement entries are the same, component
by component, in both matrices. In particular, this is the case if each of these






















The columns of X0 are perfectly correlated, whereas the last column of Y 0 diﬀers
from the ﬁrst two. As a consequence, X0 is more correlated than Y 0. To satisfy
CIM, we would have to have Y 0  X0, which is not the case.
As noted in Section 2, the framework used here has also been employed to analyze
the measurement of inequality under uncertainty. In this interpretation, the ijth
entry in an allocation matrix is the income (or the interpersonally comparable utility)
of individual i in state j. An important feature of this model is that the units in
which incomes in diﬀerent states are measured are the same. If  is interpreted as
being the preference relation of a social decision-maker, then Theorem 10 implies
that CIM must be violated if  treats individuals symmetrically and it respects the
axioms of expected utility theory applied to allocation matrices. This follows because
the expected utility axioms include an independence assumption that implies SSEP
and, hence, WSEP. This raises the question as to which, if any, model of decision-
making under uncertainty is compatible with ANON and CIM.
Schmeidler (1989) has suggested representing a preference over uncertain out-
comes by a Choquet integral with respect to a non-additive measure. This model
does not employ the independence assumption of expected utility theory. Neverthe-
less, by adapting an example due to Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997), we
are able to show that Schmeidler’s proposal is inconsistent with CIM if  satisﬁes
ANON.
22Suppose that  is represented by a Choquet functional V on D. A subset S
of D is comonotonic if for all X,Y ∈ S, xij > xi0j0 implies that yij ≥ yi0j0.19 The
most relevant feature here of a Choquet functional is that it is linear on any cone of












If Z is comonotonic with both X and Y , then the linearity of V implies that V (X +
Z) = V (X) + V (Z) and V (Y + Z) = V (Y ) + V (Z), from which it follows that




















where X0 = X + Z and Y 0 = Y + Z. Clearly, X0 C Y 0. Therefore, provided that
individuals are treated symmetrically, Schmeidler’s model is not compatible with
CIM.20
Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997) have suggested that instead of using
Schmeidler’s model when measuring inequality under uncertainty, one should instead
represent  by a multiple-priors (min-of-means) functional. A functional V on
D is a multiple-priors functional if there exists a compact and convex set C of
probability measures over the product space N×Q such that for all X ∈ D, V (X) =
minp∈C
P
i,j pijxij, where pij is the probability put by p on the ijth entry in an
allocation matrix. This kind of functional was introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989). The multiple-priors model is ﬂexible enough to be compatible with both
ANON and CIM. As a consequence, the more general model considered by Gajdos
and Maurin (2002) is also compatible with these axioms.
9. Concluding Remarks
The social evaluation orderings axiomatized in this article all have representations
that can be expressed in terms of a two-stage aggregation procedure. In the ﬁrst
19Note that this deﬁnition implicitly assumes that the nq variables are all measured in the same
units.
20Koshevoy and Mosler (1997) have proposed two multi-attribute extensions of the Gini index
of relative inequality. One of these indices is based on the characterization of the Gini in terms of
the expected relative mean diﬀerence of the incomes and the other is based on the characterization
of the Gini in terms of the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal of a unit square. For
each of their indices, it is readily veriﬁed that the allocation matrices X0 and Y 0 are regarded as
exhibiting the same degree of inequality even though X0 is more correlated than Y 0.
23stage, the distributions of each attribute are aggregated using generalized Gini social
evaluation functions. The value of the representation function is then determined
by aggregating these generalized Ginis. When an inequality index is derived from a
social evaluation ordering having this structure, it is a simple matter to determine
the contribution of each attribute to overall inequality. However, as Theorem 10
demonstrates, the cost of having this aggregation property is that it is not possible
to satisfy CIM. How serious this drawback is depends on whether one thinks that
an inequality index is simply a measure of the dispersion of an allocation matrix or
whether one thinks that it should also take account of the correlation between its
rows. For those that hold the latter view, our results provide a benchmark from
which to judge the role that axioms like CIM play in determining the functional
structure of an inequality index.
The work of List (1999) and Tsui (1999) sheds some light on the classes of
inequality indices that satisfy the inequality counterparts of CIM and either WUPM
or WUM. However, as List notes, Tsui employs a controversial decomposability
axiom. On the other hand, List’s indices are all constructed by using a utility
function to reduce the problem to one of univariate inequality measurement and
this, too, may be seen as being unduly restrictive. There is therefore much scope
for further axiomatic investigations of multidimensional inequality.
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